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]. Morgan Kousser 
Making Separate Equal: Integration of Black 
and White School Funds in Kentucky On August 
6, I 882, Kentucky voters approved by a 54-46 margin a refer-
endum proposal to increase school property taxes for whites by 
ro percent in order to triple state-level educational expenditures 
for black children. Passage of the measure equalizing state spend-
ing, which accounted for about 64 percent of the total amount 
allocated to public primary and secondary schools in Kentucky in 
the I 88os, was, according to state school superintendent Joshua 
Desha Pickett, "the most remarkable fact in the school history of 
Kentucky." 1 
Why did this referendum, an event not directly paralleled in 
any other southern state, take place? Why did the Kentucky 
electorate, 84 percent of which was white, pass such a measure? 
What types of voters favored or opposed it? And how well do 
the events surrounding the referendum accord with historians' 
generalizations about postbellum black history? For instance, in 
his Jefferson lectures on r-acia-l equality in America, John Hope 
Franklin asserted that 
. . . the position of freedmen in the postwar South was scarcely 
better than that of free blacks in the antebellum period. . . . The 
Reconstruction years were marked by halfhearted, lighthearted, 
inconclusive steps taken by the state and federal governments to 
introduce a semblance of racial equality in America. The feeble 
effort was an abject failure .... There were few voices raised 
anywhere against the far-reaching [post-Reconstruction] program 
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looking to the degradation and humiliation of blacks everywhere . 
. . . the emancipation of the slaves had no discernible effect on the 
movement for racial equality. 2 
Were blacks, at least in Kentucky, as powerless and friendless as 
Franklin claims? By bringing both impressionistic and quantita-
tive evidence to bear on these factual and historiographical ques-
tions, I attempt to illuminate at least one important and previously 
almost unnoticed corner of the largely murky political and edu-
cational history of the border states, as well as to demonstrate the 
usefulness of a statistical technique--logit analysis-which has so 
far escaped the attention of social and political historians. 3 
Since they were never subjected to military Reconstruction 
and escaped having their antebellum constitutions recast by Re-
publican-dominated tonstitutional conventions, the Democrats 
who controlled the !?order states of Delaware, Kentucky, and 
Maryland were much freer than their ex-Confederate counterparts 
to define as they wished the legal status of their former slaves. 4 
Nowhere was this fact more evident than in the halting, 
ungenerous gestures toward black education in unreconstructed 
Kentucky. Pressured by the Freedmen's Bureau, the legislature in 
r866 dedicated half of the poll and property taxes paid by blacks 
to black schools, a scheme which raised about 13.5 cents per black 
child from six to twenty years of age. White expenditures per 
child were about six times as high. In r868, however, the legis-
2 Franklin, Racial Equality in America (Chicago, 1976), 6o-62, 72. In a similarly pessimistic 
vein, W. Augustus Low, another prominent Afro-American historian, and the former 
editor of the journal of Negro History, recently asserted that "As in the Deep South, public 
education for the Negro in Kentucky was virtually nonexistent until after the tum of the 
century." See Low, "The Freedman's Bureau in the Border States," in Richard 0. Curry 
(ed.), Radicalism, Racism, and Party Realignment: The Border States During Reconstruction 
(Baltimore, 1969), 253. 
3 Victor B. Howard, "The Struggle for Equal Education in Kentucky, 1866-1884," 
Journal of Negro Education, XLVI (1977), 305-328, covers some of the same events analyzed 
here, but is silent on the political struggles involved, includes no statistical analysis, and 
is misleading on several points. 
4 On the border state systems, see KCSR (188cr-81), 236; Harold B. Hancock, "Recon-
struction in Delaware," in Curry (ed.), Radicalism, 207, 214. The system of racially separate 
taxation and allocation in these states was nationally notorious. See, e.g., John Eaton, Jr. 
(U.S. Commissioner of Education) to Thomas W. Conway in Louisiana Schools Report 
(1872), 57-58; a report of the National Education Assembly meeting in 1882 in Cincinnati 
Commercial, Aug. 28, 1882. 
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lature, dominated by a "Bourbon" Democratic faction which 
openly "scoffed at education for Negroes," declared that all 
money from black taxes was to go for the support of black 
paupers. There were apparently no state-supported black schools 
in Kentucky from 1868 until 1874, when the legislature, antici-
pating congressional passage of a bill allocating funds from public 
lands to those states which provided a free education to all children 
between six and sixteen, revived the separate-tax-and-allocation 
system for black education. 5 
The 1874 law provided that all state property and license 
taxes paid by blacks would go to black education. Because the 
tax on black property would yield such a small sum, the legisla-
ture additionally authorized a $1 poll tax on black, but not white, 
male adults. Although no funds from white taxes would be spent 
for black education, the legislature did hold out the promise that 
some of the expected federal aid might be used to upgrade black 
schools. Since the federal largesse never materialized, however, 
the system remained racially inequitable in both taxation and 
expenditures. In 1876, for example, the state allocated $1.90 for 
each white child between the ages of six and twenty, but only 
thirty cents for each black child between six and sixteen, or nearly 
nine times as much for whites as blacks if the age bases of the 
two groups had been equalized. 6 
The split on the separate and unequal system was partisan as 
well as racial. Blacks and their white Republican allies vocifer-
ously denounced the 1874 law, which most white Republican 
legislators had opposed as unfair to blacks. Black leaders, who 
had been demanding equal taxation and equal education in con-
5 Hambleton Tapp, "Three Decades of Kentucky Politics, 187tr-1900," unpub. Ph.D. 
diss. (Univ. of Kentucky, 1950), 45-46; Thomas Cavin Venable, "A History of Negro 
Education in Kentucky," unpub. Ph.D. diss. (George Peabody College for Teachers, 
1952), 7tr-79; Moses Edward Ligon, A History of Public Education in Kentucky (Lexington, 
Ky., 1942), 245-247; Gilbert Thomas Stephenson, Race Distinctions in American Law (New 
York, 1969; orig. pub. 1910), 196--199. For the effect of proposed federal aid law, see 
KCSR (1879), 196. 
6 For provisions of the law, see Louisville Commercial, Dec. 12, 1881; for statistics, KCSR 
(1884-86), 146-147; for expectation of federal aid, KCSR (1879), 8!r99. For vehement 
Republican opposition to the bill and a Republican attempt in the 1873-74 legislative 
session to enact equal funding for black and white schools, see Kentucky Senate Journal 
(1873-74), 325-326, 396--398, 457, 478-484, 769; Kentucky House Journal (1873-74), 
756--763; speech of GOP Attorney-General nominee William Cassius Goodloe, Louisville 
Commercial, July 30, 1875. 
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ventions since at least I869, pressured the I875 GOP state con-
vention to commit itself to equal funding. "As a matter ofjustice, 
no less than of wise statesmanship," the Republican party's plat-
form declared in its first plank on state issues, "we hold that the 
provision now made for the education of colored children should 
be increased until they are afforded, in their separate schools, 
facilities of obtaining instruction in every respect equal to those 
provided for white education." While the I 87 5 Democratic plat-
form was silent on this, as on all other state issues, James B. 
McCreary, the party's candidate for governor, harshly denounced 
the Republican proposal. The Democratic state superintendent of 
schools patronizingly dismissed black protests as a mere reflection 
of a "captious disposition to find fault with everything that is 
done for them." And the state's leading "New Departure" Dem-
ocratic organ urged blacks to show their thanks for finally receiv-
ing at least some school money by voting Democratic; otherwise, 
the paternalistic and comparatively moderate Courier-journal 
counseled, the Negroes would prove themselves "a race of pig-
headed irreconcilables. " 7 
Petitions, speeches, and conventions having left the I874 law 
unscathed, the blacks turned to the courts. On November 25, 
I 88 I, a white Paducah attorney, Emmet W. Bagby, a former 
Republican congressional candidate who was chairman of the 
county GOP committee and a member of the party's state com-
mittee, argued the case of Kentucky v. jesse Ellis in the federal 
7 On the 1869 and 1875 black conventions, see "Kentucky State Colored Educational 
Convention Held at Benson's Theater, Louisville, Kentucky, July 14, 1869" (undated 
pamphlet in Library of Congress), 17; Lexington American Citizen, Nov. 13, 1875; Louisville 
Commercial, Nov. 12, 1875. The GOP platform and typical speeches supporting it by 
Republican gubernatorial candidate John Marshall Harlan are in Louisville Commercial, May 
14, June 19, July 13, 1875. The Feb. 8, 1882 Commercial estimated that one-third of 
Kentucky Republicans were black, which probably overstated the number of white Re-
publicans, for obvious reasons. Although the 1871 Republican platform contained no such 
explicit provision, it did denounce the Democrats for failing to make "adequate provision" 
for black schools and several GOP candidates endorsed complete equalization during that 
campaign. Ibid., July 22, 27, Aug. 2, 4, 1871. Democratic gubernatorial candidate (1871) 
P. H. Leslie, by contrast, opposed "dividing the school fund with the nigger," and called 
for repeal of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, and the Democracy's 
candidate for state school superintendent, H. A. M. Henderson, favored abandoning the 
public schools entirely if the only alternative was dividing the white fund. Ibid., June 3, 
30, 1871. For McCreary's denunciation and the newspaper statement, see Louisville Courier-
Journal, July 28, JO, 1875. For the superintendent's attitude, see KCSR (1874), 29; (1875), 
107; (1876), 21; quotation from 1875 report. 
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circuit court. In his brief Bagby challenged the state's right to 
collect a poll tax for support of black schools from Ellis, a black 
m.an, when it did not impose such a tax on whites. More broadly, 
Bagby averred that the entire system of Kentucky schools sup-
ported by racially separate taxes was contrary to the equal pro-
tection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the more express 
provisions of the federal civil rights act, and was therefore wholly 
unconstitutional. 8 
While the Ellis case was pending in federal court, Republicans 
in the I 88 r-82 session of the state legislature decided to force the 
issue more directly. On January 7, r882, Republican House leader 
James Breathitt introduced a bill to merge the two school funds 
and to equalize the taxes, school terms, and eligible age-groups 
of whites and blacks immediately, and to submit the question of 
raising school property taxes by ro mills, which would have 
amounted to a 50 percent rise for whites, to a referendum at the 
time of the August i882 state elections. 9 The crucial roll call came 
on April ro, when by a 37-29 margin, the House voted to post-
pone the Breathitt bill until after the legislature's scheduled ad-
journment date. The Republican Louisville Commercial exploded 
in wrath: 
The conspiracy at Frankfort to defy the Constitution of the United 
States and precipitate a civil war has not yet been destroyed. Thanks 
to the density and extent of Bourbon ignorance and its perpetuation 
in the Legislature, Kentucky is the only State in the Union which 
has not accepted the war amendments to the Federal constitution. 
8 On black and Republican activities in favor of equalization between 1875 and r88r, see 
Tapp, "Kentucky Politics," 144, 180, 228. Unreported by the West Publishing Company, 
the Ellis case has rarely been noticed before. The Louisville Commercial, Dec. I2, I88I 
published Bagby's federal court brief in full. On Bagby, see Paducah Daily News, Feb. 25, 
March I8, May IJ, I882;Frankjort Weekly Yeoman, Nov. I9, 1878, May 29, I883;Louisville 
Commercial, Aug. II, 1882, March 2, I883. Section I977 of the U.S. Revised Statutes then 
in effect expressly prohibited racially unequal taxation. (The U.S. Supreme Court's de-
cision in The Civil Rights Cases, I09 U.S. 3, which declared much of the I875 Civil Rights 
Act unconstitutional, was not issued until I883.) 
9 Several black Republican conventions had demanded the introduction of such a bill in 
the I88I-82 legislature. See, e.g., Louisville Commercial, May I4, I88I. On Breathitt, see 
William Elsey Connelley and E. Merton Coulter, History of Kentucky (Chicago, I922), IV, 
I02-IIJ; Louisville Commercial, Dec. 7, I88I, March 24, 1882. For the introduction, 
provisions, and actions on his bill, see Louisville Commercial, Jan. 9, Feb. I4, March 2, I7, 
April I I, June 9, I882; Louisville Courier-journal, March 29, April 1, 12, I882; Kentucky 
Senate Journal (I88r-82), 798. 
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. . . When these antediluvian unteachables placed themselves at 
Frankfort in the attitude of implacable hostility to the great cause 
of equal education, and with barbaric obtuseness refused to recog-
nize the harmonizing and liberalizing and elevating influences of 
the age which give glory to our common country, they committed 
the one signal crime that was needed to kill and damn them polit-
ically .10 
But the Commercial underrated the talent of the Democracy 
(the Democratic party) for survival, just as the Democrats had 
forgotten the blacks' ability to gain in court what they could not 
otherwise win in the legislature. For on the same day that it noted 
the postponement of the Breathitt bill in Frankfort, the Commercial 
reported Judge John Baxter's decision in favor of Ellis in Paducah. 
The Fourteenth Amendment, Baxter averred, meant that 
" ... any fund created by the state for educational purposes must 
be equally and uniformly distributed among both classes, and 
neither in the raising ~f the fund by taxation, nor in the distri-
bution of it, must there be any inequality or any discrimination 
on account of race or color." Although he ordered no immediate 
remedy, Baxter referred to his earlier decision in U.S. v. Burttin, 
in which he had ruled that unless black schools in Ohio were 
"equal [to white schools] in the benefits provided," the segregated 
school system would have to be dismantled. 11 
The decisions in Ellis and Buntin and the threat by Paducah 
blacks to go back to court to seek an appropriate remedy presented 
the Democrats in the legislature with three alternatives: equalize, 
IO Louisville Commercial, April I2, IJ, I882. Similarly, though not so vituperatively, see 
Louisville Bulletin (black) and Indianapolis Journal, quoted in Louisville Commercial, April 
IS, I882; Cleveland Leader (black), quoted in Louisville Courier-Journal, March IO, I882; 
N~w York Tribune, quoted in Louisville Courier-Journal, April I8, I882, and accompanying 
editorial in Louisville Courier-Journal, same date. 
I I Bagby had not asked for any specific remedy. See Paducah Daily News, Feb. 29, I882. 
Altho~.;gh the Ellis case was apparently decided on April 4, the news seems to have taken 
a week to travel from Paducah to Louisville, and one day longer to get to Frankfort. U.S. 
v. Buntin, 10 Fed. Rep. 730. The quotations in the Buntin and Ellis cases were taken from 
Louisville Commercial, April11, I882. For an incisive gloss on the two cases, see Owensboro 
Messenger, June 9, I882. For threats to return to court by attorney Bagby and a mass 
meeting of Paducah blacks, see Louisville Commercial, April 11, I8, 20, I882. For a 
recognition of the dilemma posed by Ellis by]. A. Munday, a Democratic state senator, 
see Owensboro Messenger, May 2, I882. 
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integrate, or close the schools. 12 Although some Democrats and 
all but one Republican favored a simple bill equalizing the funds 
per child and raising the school property tax rate sufficiently to 
prevent a decline in the current level of white expenditures, many 
Democratic members still opposed any white support for black 
schools. To prevent a serious Democratic split, House Speaker 
William C. Owens and his chief lieutenant Clarence U. McElroy 
proposed a clever compromise. Their bill equalized the funds and 
raised taxes, but would go into effect only if a majority of the 
voters approved at the August election. So-called "young Dem-
ocrats" could therefore appeal to blacks and nonracist whites by 
pointing to their votes for equalization; "Bourbons" could satisfy 
themselves that the voters would disapprove the measure; all 
could shift the burden of raising taxes to their constituents; and 
if the measure failed and closure, integration, or chaos followed, 
then it would be the voters, and not the legislators, who would 
be to blame. 13 
On April21, the House considered the McElroy-Owens bill 
and several amendments. It defeated by 33-51 and 37-48 margins 
amendments by Breathitt and Democrat James H. Mulligan, who 
sought to equalize the funds without a referendum and raise the 
white tax rate by 3 mills and 2 mills, respectively. Then the body 
voted 48-30 against a compromise by Democratic Representative 
12 For Democratic fears of the effect of Ellis, see Louisville Courier-Journal, April 14, 
1882. "It may be well enough," Bagby contended in the April 18 Commercial, which was 
widely read by Democrats in the legislature, "to let the Democratic party in Kentucky 
know, right here, that the petty, vexing tryanny of such legislation will not be longer 
tolerated in this State. If the school fund for the education of the common school children 
of the State is not equalized by this Legislature, then the proper officers whose duty it is 
to collect and distribute the fund will be forced, by legal process, to distribute it, pro rata, 
among all the pupil children of the Commonwealth. There will be a meeting of leading 
colored citizens in this city [Paducah] within a few days, who will take into consideration 
the measures necessary to secure this result." 
13 On Owens, see Tapp, "Kentucky Politics," 409-410; H. Levin (ed.), The Lawyers 
and Lawmakers of Kentucky (Chicago, 1897), 572-574. On McElroy and the authorship of 
the bill, see Louisville Courier-journal, June 9, 1882; Louisville Post, May 4, 1882. All these 
positions, except the "Bourbon," were enunciated at a ~ocratic caucus meeting, which 
was reported fully in the Louisville Commercial and Louisville Courier-Journal, April 21, 
1882. Most "Bourbons" stalked out of the caucus, but some of these opponents of 
equalization voted for McElroy-Owens in the House the next day. For more information 
on the various positions, see Louisville Courier-Journal, April 12, 22, June 4, July 28, Aug. 
2, 1882; Louisville Commercial, May 25, 1882. 
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A. W. Moremen whicJ1. would have integrated the funds at once, 
but allowed a referendum on a 2.5-mill tax hike. Finally, the 
House passed the leadership's measure unamended, 64-18. The 
Senate on April 22 voted down an amendment providing for a 2-
mill increase and immediate equalization by a r6-r2 count, and 
then passed the House bill, 26-2. 14 
Rather than try to categorize the legislators by employing a 
sophisticated scaling procedure, I have divided the House mem-
bers into four groups on simple commonsensical grounds. Be-
cause the eight representatives who voted for the Breathitt bill, 
but against the McElroy-Owens referendum proposal, seem to 
have been so outraged at any delay in equalizing the funds that 
they were willing to kill the one measure which had a chance to 
pass, I have denominated them "radicals." Next come thirty 
"liberal" House members who favored both McElroy-Owens and 
at least one of the substitutes offered by Mulligan, Moremen, and 
Breathitt. All but three of these men voted for the Breathitt 
amendment. Thirty-seven "regular" Democrats, one Green-
backer, and one GOP member opposed all the substitutes, but 
voted for McElroy-Owens. Finally, the eight Democrats and two 
Greenbackers who opposed any change, despite the danger that 
the federal court would force integration or suspension of the 
school system, were so unwilling to budge that they deserve the 
"Bourbon" appellation. 15 
It may well be that the roll calls do not perfectly mirror the 
complex structure of attitudes on issues related to equalization. 
Since the "radicals" joined the "Bourbons" in voting against 
McElroy-Owens, it is clear that the votes do not fall into a simple 
unidimensional Guttman scale. It appears that the votes tapped at 
least three dimensions: attitudes toward parties, toward tax in-
creases, and toward equalization. Thus, some quite racist Dem-
ocrats no doubt favored McElroy-Owens only because the lead-
ership convinced them that the measure was necessary for the 
party's welfare, that since the court was going to order equali-
zation anyway, the Democracy might as well take credit for it. 
I4 Kentucky House journal (I88I-82), IS78-IS82; Kentucky Senate journal (I88I-82), 
I I7o-I I76. 
Is The party designations of the legislators were given in Louisville Commercial, Nov. 7, 
I88 I. 
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And other Democrats acted as if they had a preferred level ("bliss 
point") of tax increases. Whereas Breathitt and the Republicans 
felt it a propitious time for hiking taxes by 50 percent, some 
Democrats would have tolerated a IO percent, but not a I 5 percent 
increase. Unfortunately, there were too few roll calls to allow us 
to distinguish these attitudes mathematically through some mul-
tidimensional scaling or cohesion procedure, and the compromise 
McElroy-Owens bill conflated several dimensions-precisely as 
it was meant to do. Anytime that there is competent leadership 
in a legislature there will be logrollling which will result in the 
passage of legislation, but will impede an analyst who mechani-
cally applies scaling algorithms without really knowing how the 
key legislators have shaped the agenda. 16 
Party and racial attitude explain many of the legislators' 
votes. Table I shows that all but one of the House Republicans 
fell into the liberal or radical categories, whereas Democrats and 
Greenbackers wen~ much more likely to cluster toward the 
"Bourbon" end of the scale. If party loyalty and the attitudes 
which caused them to join the GOP in the first place account for 
the Republicans' behavior, what explains that of the Democrats? 
Table 2 cross-classifies groupings among the Democrats on the 
equalization issue with a February 3 House vote on a bill to 
Table 1 Party and Groupings on Equalization Bills 
GROUP PARTY 
DEMOCRAT REPUBLICAN 
Bourbons 8 o 
Regulars 3 7 I 
Liberals I 5 I 5 
Radicals 4 4 
Abstained or 
Insufficient votes IO 2 
Chi-Square = 36.58 (P < .ooi) 
GREENBACK 
2 
0 
0 
r6 Advice to Democrats to bow gracefully to the inevitable is given in, e.g. the Paducah 
News, quoted in Owensboro Messenger, Aug. 4, r882, as well as in papers cited in note 13, 
above. On preferred levels of tax increases, see Louisville Courier-Journal, April 12, 23, 
r882. The role of legislative leaders was perhaps particularly crucial in Kentucky, where, 
as Tapp, "Kentucky Politics," 474, notes, "the inefficiency of the state's lawmakers was 
notorious." 
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Table 2 Groupings on Equalization and Votes on 
Whipping Post Bill (Democrats Only) 
, GROUP ON 
EQUALIZATION 
Bourbons 
Regulars 
Liberals 
Radicals 
Abstain 
FOR 
7 
23 
4 
I 
3 
WHIPPING POST BILL 
AGAINST ABSTAIN 
0 
5 9 
IO I 
3 0 
4 2 
Chi-Square = 24.28 (P < .ooi) 
reestablish the whipping post for petty theft, a vote which ap-
parently reflected racial attitudes quite closely. The table shows 
that a hefty majority of those who favored a return to the ante-
bellum method of punishing blacks opposed equalization, and 
vice-versa. All but one Republican who was recorded on the 
whipping-post issue opposed its reestablishment, whereas the four 
Greenbackers split evenly.t7 
But if the Democrats' vote on the equalization issue appears 
largely to have reflected the racial beliefs of the legislators and 
their constituencies, what explains variations in those racial atti-
tudes across constituencies? One approach to such a question 
would be to subdivide the constituencies into various groups on 
the basis of their scores on certain socioeconomic or political 
indices and to look at the resultant bivariate cross-classification 
tables. For instance, one might separate rural from urban legis-
lators and see whether those from each demographic group tended 
to fall into different attitude groups. Then one could repeat the 
process for other demographic classifications. 
17 It is unclear what interest the Greenbackers had in "Bourbon" policies, but that 
party's greatest strength was in the extreme western end of the state, which had been the 
chief hotbed of Confederate sentiment during the War. All four Greenbacker legislators 
came from this area. Perhaps racist sentiments were stronger there, although the propor-
tion of blacks in that section was lower than in the bluegrass area. Or perhaps western 
Kentucky had gone with the Confederacy because it had had fewer economic ties with the 
North and more with the South than other areas in the state, and residual antipathy to the 
party of the Union pushed them into Bourbonism. For the division in wartime sentiments, 
see Ross A. Webb, "Kentucky: 'Pariah Among the Elect'," in Curry, Radicalism, 109. The 
best souce on the Kentucky Greenbackers, Edward F. Prichard's "Popular Political Move-
ments in Kentucky, 1875-1900," unpub. senior thesis (Princeton University, 1935) has 
nothing to say on the party's racial attitudes. On the racist nature of arguments for the 
whipping post bill, see Richmond Kentucky Register, Dec. 16, 1882, in which that Demo-
cratic paper stated that "the petty thieves of the State are nearly all [N]egroes .... " 
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There are three problems with this method. First, it is diffi-
cult to detect spurious correlations or interactions between two 
or more independent variables in cross-tabulation tables. For in-
stance, those legislators who came from heavily black rural areas 
might be more conservative in their racial views than all legislators 
from counties with high percentages of blacks or all rural solons. 
In a particular case, it might be that the apparent correlation 
between urbanism and racism dissolved when one controlled for 
the proportion of blacks in each area. Second, the analyst often 
knows not only that one county was more urban, say, than 
another, but also how much more urban it was. Such "interval 
level" information is lost if one simply divides the legislators into 
groups. Third, simple methods of cross-classification, such as 
analysis of variance, are based on a linear model, but the relation-
ships of interest may not be linear. For instance, a Democratic 
legislator from a wholly white county might be as willing to 
ignore black voters- as one from a county which was 20 percent 
black; a representative from a 50 percent black county would 
imperil his career much more by writing off the black vote than 
one from a county in which blacks made up 30 percent of the 
electorate. 
These problems can be remedied by employing logit analysis, 
one of a group of advanced techniques which have recently been 
applied to the investigation of multivariate contingency tables. 18 
The logit model is based on the so-called "odds ratio." If the 
odds are six to five that a certain horse will win a race, then the 
probability that he will prevail, according to the touts, is six-
elevenths, or about 54.5 percent. If we let p stand for the prob-
ability of winning, or choosing a certain alternative, or falling 
into a certain group, then the ratio can be expressed as: 
Odds ratio = _£_1 -p 
r8 Yvonne M. M. Bishop, Stephen E. Fienberg, and Paul W. Holland, Discrete Multi-
variate Analysis: Theory and Practice (Cambridge, Mass., 1975); David K. Hildebrand, James 
D. Laing, and Howard Rosenthal, Prediction Analysis of Cross Classifications (New York, 
1977). In addition, logit can be used to describe relationships between interval-level 
variables, or between sets of variables which are nominal, ordinal, and interval. There is 
currently no good expository introduction to logit, but see Takes hi Ameniya, "Qualitative 
Response Models," Annals of Economic and Social Measurement, IV (1975), 363-372; Henri 
Theil, Principles of Econometrics (New York, 1971), 628-635; G. S. Maddala, Econometrics 
(New York, 1977), r62-r8r. 
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The actual logit equation, the parameters of which must be esti-
mated by an iterative computer algorithm unless all the variables 
are measured at nominal or ordinal levels, is: 
(2) ln(p/(1- p)) = f3o + {3,X, + f3zXz + · · · + f3nXn + U, 
where 1 n indicates that it is the natural logarithm of the odds 
ratio which is actually estimated, the betas are parameters, the Xs 
are independent variables, and the U is the error term. After 
estimating the parameters, one may compute the probabilities for 
various levels of the independent variables. 
Since the dependent variable is related to the independent 
variable in a nonlinear rather than a linear fashion, the estimated 
probabilities will not be the same at different levels of the inde-
pendent variables. In the more familiar linear regression equation, 
the dependent variable is assumed to change by the same amount 
for a given change in an independent variable, whether the latter 
changes from, say, zero to ten or from ninety to one hundred on 
some scale. In the logit equation, the relationship is sigmoid or 
S-shaped, rather than linear, and the probabilities which can be 
derived from the parameter estimates will vary, depending on 
choices about the levels of the independent variables (see Fig. r). 
Because the parameters in a logit equation have no simple inter-
pretation, the estimates will be reported here as probabilities, but 
the reader should be aware that there is art as well as science 
involved in the choice of levels of the independent variables at 
which the probabilities are computed. In tables 3-5, for instance, 
I report the probabilities of falling into each legislative group 
contingent on setting the independent variables to their statewide 
means as well as to points a standard deviation above and below 
their means. Although I picked these points to show changes in 
the probabilities over a wide range of levels of the independent 
variables, the particular levels themselves are arbitrary, and the 
probabilities reported in the tables would differ somewhat if other 
points had been selected. t9 
To show how such probabilities are arrived at in the logit 
procedure, consider the case of estimating the probability of vot-
ing "yes" for a legislator from an average county in an either/or 
19 For reaso~s of space the logit coefficients, which, unlike regression coefficients, have 
no simple interpretation, will not be printed here, but are available, alo·ng with their 
standard errors, from the author. 
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Fig. 1 An S-shaped Logit Curve 
y 
vote with abstainers excluded. After exponentiating both sides 
and performing some algebraic manipulations, the logit equation 
becomes: 
(3) p(yes) = exp (/3'X)/(1 + exp (/3'X)), 
where exp is the natural exponential function, {3' a transposed 
vector of parameters (previously estimated by computer), and X 
a vector of the means of the independent variables. To compute 
probabilities at other levels of the independent variables merely 
requires plugging different values of the Xs into equation (3). 
Formulas for a larger number of alternatives and different com-
binations of variables are messier, but once the betas have been 
estimated by computer, the corresponding probabilities can be 
determined with a hand calculator which has slide-rule functions. 
The logit technique enables us to ask some interesting ques-
tions about the behavior of the sixty-seven Democratic and 
Greenbacker House members who were recorded on enough roll 
calls to place them in one of the four groups. (Since all but one 
of the Republicans fell into the liberal or radical groups, they will 
be excluded from this part of the analysis.) To what degree did 
their votes in April represent the feelings of their constituents in 
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the August I 882 referendum? How did the party balance in the 
legislators' counties affect the representatives' votes on equaliza-
tion? Were those from overwhelmingly Democratic areas more 
or less likely to favor it? And how much influence did different 
characteristics of their counties' socioeconomic makeup have on 
the legislators' actions? Were legislators from relatively heavily 
black counties more or less likely to take a liberal or radical 
position than those from virtually all-white counties? How did 
the variables interact with each other? 
Since the number of independent variables on which data are 
available is large, the number of different equations which could 
be estimated, if all possible interactions between and combinations 
of variables were considered, is even larger. I shall concentrate on 
the equations of the greatest substantive importance. Table 3 
contains logit estimates of the probability that a Democratic or 
Greenbacker legislator would fall into each of the three indicated 
groups if his county had voted a certain way in the I 88o presi-
dential election. For instance, in a hypothetical county where 56.5 
percent of the voters backed the Democrats, 8. 5 percent the 
Greenbackers, 34.8 percent the GOP, and 0.2 percent abstained, 
about I2 percent of the Democratic and Greenbacker legislators 
were likely to be radicals or liberals, about 7I percent probably 
supported only McElroy-Owens, and one in six opposed all 
change. 20 
The modal category in all but the last row is the "regular" 
column-most Democrats followed their leaders. Legislators 
from heavily Democratic counties (who appear in the first four 
rows), where racism was presumably more prevalent than else-
where, were disproportionately likely to be Bourbons, whereas 
those who came from counties where only a third of the electorate 
was solid for the party of the Confederacy were more likely to 
be liberals or radicals than Bourbons. Variations in support for 
the Greenback presidential candidate in r88o had a very small 
20 Since only four Democrats fell into the radical category, I have consolidated it with 
the liberal category here to decrease the errors in estimation. I use the words "probabilities" 
and "percentages" interchangeably to apply to the transformed logit estimates, since if the 
probability that a person living in a county would vote a certain way is, say, 12%, then 
12% of the people in the county would, on average, be expected to vote that way. The 
means of the party percentages for the counties from which the legislators came are given 
in the fifth row of Table 3. 
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Table 3 Logit Estimates of Relationship between County Votes in 1 88o 
Presidential Election and Legislative Groupings on Equaliza-
tion in 1882 Legislature 
COUNTY VOTE IN I88o ELECTION 
DEM. GRBK. REPUB. ABSTAIN 
.565 .085 ·348 .002 
. 565 .085 . 172 · 178 
.565 -o- ·348 .087 
. 565 -o- .172 .263 
·444 a .03 I .260 .265 
·323 .085 ·348 .244 
-323 -o- ·348 -329 
-323 .085 .172 -420 
-323 -o- .!72 -505 
Actual percent in each group ... 
PREDICTED PERCENTAGE OF 
LEGISLATORS IN GROUP 
RAD.-LIB. REG. BOURBON 
.I22 
-7I2 .I66 
.187 ·578 .235 
. 154 .682 .I64 
.23 I 
·543 .226 
.270 .583 . 147 
.288 .617 .095 
·347 .565 .o88 
.41 I ·466 . !23 
·478 -410 .I 12 
.284 .567 .149 
Percent of legislators correctly placed in groups = .627 
a Means of all independe;.lt variables are in this row. 
effect on the likelihood that the county would produce a Bourbon, 
but a decline in the proportion of votes that the Greenbackers 
received was associated with a rise in the proportion of legislators 
in the leftward groups. 
The table's most fascinating relationship is between Repub-
lican strength and Democratic legislative behavior. Increases in 
the Republican presidential vote were correlated with declines in 
both Bourbonism and liberalism (compare, for instance, rows one 
and two, or six and eight). Apparently a relatively strong GOP 
corralled the Democrats into party regularity; whereas a weak one 
left them free to follow their personal or constituency predilec-
tions instead of staying with the herd. Although one should not 
stress these conclusions too much, since they are based on coef-
ficients with rather large standard errors and equations which 
misclassify many legislators, it would be interesting to see 
whether the same pattern of party loyalty and opposition strength 
held in other states and for other issues. 
As Table 4 shows, the legislators appear to have reflected 
constituency sentiment fairly closely. Counties which recorded a 
high level of opposition to the equalization proposal in the August 
referendum produced many fewer racial liberals in the legislature 
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Table 4 Logit Estimates ofRelationship between County Votes in Au-
gust, 1882 Referendum on Equalization and Legislative Group-
ings on Equalization in I 882 
VOTE IN REFERENDUM PREDICTED PERCENT 
OF LEGISLATURE 
FOR AGAINST ABSTAIN RAD. LIB. REG. BOURBON 
·430 . I 3 I ·439 .02I ·348 -5I4 . I I7 
-430 
-377 .I93 .026 .037 .844 .093 
·3 I 5 a .254 ·43 I .064 . I75 .6I4 . I47 
.200 . I 3 I .669 . ISO 
·495 .269 .086 
.200 
-377 -423 .052 .074 .6I9 .255 
Percent of legislators correctly placed in groups = .62I 
a Means of all independent variables are in this row. 
than those in which opposition was muted in August. Those who 
came from counties where sentiment both for and against equal-
ization was high in. August overwhelmingly supported the 
McElroy-Owens compromise bill. Most striking are the last two 
rows. Representatives of areas where neither supporters nor op-
ponents of equalization polled a large vote were more likely to be 
liberals or radicals than those from counties with any other mix 
of sentiments, whereas those from counties where support was 
tepid and opposition strong were markedly more likely to be 
Bourbons. Perhaps where their constituents lacked deep feelings 
on the issue, legislators could avoid the posturing of the Demo-
cratic high command and vote for the outcome which the Ellis 
case had made inevitable. Those from unreconstructed counties 
had little choice but to try symbolically to save the old regime. 21 
The three most important demographic correlates of support 
for the liberal and radical positions, shown in Table 5, were the 
urban and Negro percentages of each county's population, and 
the value of white property per white male adult (a proxy for 
wealth per white family). 22 Urban legislators were more cos-
21 The northwest-southeast trend of Table 4 would be much more pronounced ifi could 
have included legislative Republicans. Since only one Republican fell into the regular or 
Bourbon categories, however, those cell entries were nearly empty, and the computer 
algorithm would not converge to give a solution to the equation which included legislators 
from that party. 
22 The legislative groupings have been collapsed into two categories (liberal-radical and 
regular-Bourbon) here in order to improve the reliability of the logit coefficients. 
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Table 5 Logit Estimates of Relationship between Socioeconomic Vari-
ables and Legislative Groupings on Equalization a 
SOCIOECONOMIC INDICATORS b PREDICTED 
PERCENT 
PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT BLACK WHITE WHITE LIBERAL-
BLACK CATHOLIC URBAN UNION SPENDING TAX WEALTH RADICAL 
DEMOCRATIC INCREASE INCREASE 
. 152c 
.089 .161 -.179 1.245 ·517 1322.44 .228 
.035 1.850 ·333 
.269 1.850 .106 
.035 .640 ·427 
.269 .640 .179 
.035 .279 .299 
.035 -o- ·321 
.269 .279 .II I 
.269 -o- .122 
·457 2212.56 ·378 
·457 432·32 .109 
-o- 2212.56 .092 
-o- 432.32 .020 
.035 
·457 .636 
.269 ·45~ ·339 
.269 -o- .225 
.035 -o- .079 
.035 2212.56 ·549 
.035 432·32 .198 
.269 2212.56 .263 
.269 4J2.J2 .067 
Percent of legislators correcdy placed in groups = . 8o6 
a Percent Black is the percentage of registered voters in 1882 who were black. Since registrars were 
paid to register voters, this was virtually the same as the percentage of adult males who were black. 
Percent Catholic is the percentage of total church property owned by the Roman Catholic Church. 
No church membership figures exist for this period to my knowledge. 
Percent Urban is the percentage in towns and cities over 4,000, taken from the 1880 U.S. Census of 
population. 
Percent Union Democratic is an estimate of the percentage of former Unionists (as opposed to 
Confederates) who normally voted Democratic. It was formed by subtracting the Republican vote in 
the 1879 Governor's race from the percentage for the independent (former Unionist) Jacob in the 1882 
Court of Appeals race. 
Black spending increase is the increase in spending for black schools in each county from 1882 to 1883 
divided by the number of white male adults. 
White tax increase is the increase in white property taxes from 1882 to 1883 divided by the number 
of white male adults. 
White wealth is the value of white property in 1882 divided by the number of white male adults. All 
variables except the Percent Urban and Percent Union Democratic come from the report of the state auditor 
for 1883. 
b To decrease the complexity of the table, blanks have been left instead of inserting the means of the 
variables being held constant in each row. In the second row, for instance, the value of the Percent Black 
is at .035 (a standard deviation below its mean), the Percent Catholic is at its mean (.089), the Percent 
Urban is at its mean (.161), etc. 
c Means of all independent variables are in this row. 
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mopolitan and perhaps less racially sensitive than their counter-
parts from the hills and hollows. Such Democratic urban news-
papers as the Louisville Courier-journal and Post, the Paducah Daily 
Neu;s, and the official state Democratic organ, the Frankfort Yeo-
man, were staunch supporters of equalization, at least after the 
Ellis decision. 23 City leaders must have realized also that their 
bailiwicks were prime targets for equalization suits if the legisla-
ture delayed, for the eleven urban areas contained about a third 
of the state's black children, and lawyers for the blacks would 
probably have sought to end discrimination first where equality 
would have benefited the greatest number. 24 
Other things being equal, Democratic legislators from rela-
tively heavily black counties were about 22 percent less likely to 
favor immediate equalization than those from counties which 
contained few blacks. The repeatedly documented positive rela-
tion between the strength of white racism and the threat to whites 
posed by large proportions of blacks accounts for this finding. 25 
Furthermore, white wealth per white male adult correlated pos-
itively with support for instant merging of the school funds. The 
higher the white property value per family in his county, the 
more likely a Democratic or Greenbacker legislator was to vote 
for equalization, particularly if his county were urban and had 
relatively few blacks. Apparently poor rural Democratic counties 
were hotbeds of racism, although poor rural Republican counties 
sent to the legislature representatives who staunchly supported 
23 Henry Watterson, the Courier-journal editor, had been courting the black vote in 
Kentucky and the nation for years, and fervently wished to dispel the southern Democrats' 
reactionary social image at a time when the "newer departure" Democracy seemed to be 
attracting black support. On the "newer departure," see Lawrence Grossman, The Dem-
ocratic Party and the Negro: Northern and National Politics, 1868-92 (Urbana, 1976). For 
editorials supporting equalization, see Louisville Courier-Journal, Jan. 12, Feb. 17, April 12, 
July 28, Aug. 2, 1882; Louisville Post, Aug. 5, 1882; Paducah Daily News, June 20, 22, 
1882; Richmond Kentucky Weekly Register, July 28, 1882; Frankfort Daily Yeoman, April 19, 
July 29, 1882. Thirty-nine percent of the black children in the state in 1882 lived in the 
eleven counties containing towns of over 4,000 population. 
24 Black teachers in Louisville, the state's only large city, had long agitated for equal 
pay, and received it after Ellis but before the August referendum. See Louisville Commercial, 
May 3, 1881. The threat by Henry Fitzbutler, a Louisville black leader, to file a suit to 
force that city to equalize its schools may well have forced the city school board's hand. 
Ibid., June 14, 1882. 
25 Hubert M. Blalock, Toward a Theory of Minority Group Relations (New York, 1970), 
143-189. 
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black equality. It is impossible to resolve this contradiction with 
the data at hand, but the question deserves further study. 26 
None of the other variables had large effects on the Demo-
cratic or Greenbacker legislators' propensity to favor equalization 
without a referendum. First, I hypothesized that legislators from 
more heavily Catholic areas would oppose equalization, since it 
meant higher taxes for public schools, and many Catholics sent 
their children to parochial schools in Kentucky. Second, since 
there was considerable discussion in the newspapers about a split 
in the Democratic party between ex-Unionists and ex-Confed-
erates, and since ex-Unionists were presumably less racist than 
followers of the gray, I guessed that legislators from counties 
where the "independent" candidate of the Unionist faction, 
Richard T. Jacob, ran strongest in the I 882 race for Clerk of the 
Court of Appeals would be more favorable to black equality. 
Third, I thought that the prospect of more funds coming into a 
county because of the increased level of state support for black 
education might attract votes in the counties which had large 
numbers of black children, at least when one controlled for white 
racial attitudes by including the percentage black in the equation. 
Largely white counties, in contrast, had little to gain in revenue 
from the legal change. Fourth, since the money was to be raised 
through a uniform statewide property tax, but distributed on a 
per capita basis, I surmised that counties which faced a relatively 
large per capita tax increase would be less likely to favor equali-
zation than those with comparatively little property to be taxed. 
The logit analysis of legislative groupings and county character-
istics lends little support to any of these four hypotheses. 
If the results of the analysis oflegislature's actions are clouded 
by the ability of such a body to compromise, the referendum 
called by the McElroy-Owens Act presented the voters with a 
clearer alternative-whether to merge the funds and raise the 
white tax rate to keep the white expenditure per child at approx-
imately the current rate, or refuse any change. As indicated in 
Table 6, which is based on ordinary least-squares (OLs) multiple 
26 The sign of the wealth variable may appear contradictory to the voters' economic 
self-interest, since the rich would be taxed more in the event of equalization. But note 
that the effect of such a change is controlled for by the "white tax increase" variable. The 
wealth variable therefore is purely a measure of racial attitudes in counties with different 
mean levels of wealth. 
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Table 6 Unweighted OLS Estimates of Relationships be-
tween Votes in 1879 Gubernatorial, r88o Presiden-
tial, and 1882 Court of Appeals Races and Votes 
in 1882 Referendum 
1879 GOVERNOR 1882 REFERENDUM 
fOR AGAINST ABSTAIN 
Democrat 36 41 23 
Republican 53 16 3I 
Abstain 12 29 59 
1880 PRESIDENT 1882 REfERENDUM 
fOR AGAINST ABSTAIN 
Democrat 34 37 28 
Republican 52 15 32 
Greenback 17 64 19 
Abstain 3 32 65 
I882 APPEALS COURT 1882 REFERENDUM 
fOR AGAINST ABSTAIN 
Democrat 53 35 12 
Independent 48 19 40 
Abstain 10 32 58 
regressions of the percentage of adult males in each county who 
chose different alternatives in the referendum, most Republican 
and Greenbacker voters cast their ballots as their legislators had, 
and the Democrats split, a majority of their 1879 and 1880 par-
tisans opposing the reform, while a majority of those who voted 
for the Democratic candidate for Clerk of the Courts of Appeals 
supported the measure. 
Since Kentucky, unlike most other southern states, had sev-
eral large cities, the equations which form the basis of Table 6 
may give misleading results. The OLS results may be distorted, in 
other words, by heteroskedasticity (unequal variance) in the error 
term. Population disparities between counties are taken into ac-
count in Table 7, which is based on the technique of generalized 
least-squares (GLS). The results are similar to those in Table 6, but 
indicate that much larger percentages of the Republicans sup-
ported, and considerably higher proportions of the Democrats 
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Table 7 Generalized Least Squares Estimates of Relation-
ships between Votes in 1879 Governor's, 1880 
Presidential, and 1882 Appeals Court Races and 
Votes in 1882 Equalization Referenduma 
I 879 GOVERNOR I882 REFERENDUM 
FOR AGAINST ABSTAIN 
Democrat 36 51 I3 
Republican 64 I5 21 
Abstain I I 13 76 
I 880 PRESIDENT 1882 REFERENDUM 
FOR AGAINST ABSTAIN 
Democrat 31 51 18 
Republican 68 4 28 
Greenbacker 30 117 -47 
Abstain -8 4 104 
1882 APPEALS couRT 1882 REFERENDUM 
FOR AGAINST ABSTAIN 
Democrat 55 37 7 
Independent 4I 23 36 
Abstain 10 22 68 
a The estimating equations were of the following form: 
Y/vN = vN /30 + f3,X,/vN + /3.XovN + U, 
where vN is the square root of the adult male population in each county. 
and Greenbackers opposed equalization than Table 6 had implied. 
In fact, the row showing how the 1880 Greenbackers voted in 
1 8 82 contains two logically inadmissible estimates, as does the 
row following it. 27 
Such estimates, which are fairly common in this type of 
analysis, can be dealt with by reestimating the equations and 
assuming, say, that the Greenbackers all voted against equalization 
and that the 1880 abstainers all abstained in 1882, or by ignoring 
the logical discrepancies and merely stating that the results mean 
that nearly all Greenbackers opposed the change and few 1 88o 
abstainers voted. But there is a third alternative. Since the problem 
27 See Appendix A for a further discussion of OLS and GLS. 
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Table 8 Logit Estimates of Relationship between I88o 
Presidential Race and I 882 Referendum 
•I 880 PRESIDENT I882 REFERENDUM 
FOR AGAINST ABSTAIN 
Democrat 25 5I 24 
Republican 6o IO 30 
Greenbacker 5 91 4 
Abstain IO II 79 
arises because one is using an unconstrained linear model, one 
might employ a nonlinear model, such as logit, which allows no 
estimates to fall outside the o-roo percent logical bounds. 28 
The results presented in Table 8, which is based on a logit 
model, are much more esthetically and substantively satisfying 
than those in Table 7. There are no more logically impossible 
estimates, and the 1882 behavior of those who did not vote in 
r88o is not so unrealistically extreme. Since some Democrats and 
many Greenbackers appear to have joined the r882 Jacob Move-
ment, whereas the state's only Republican congressman and sev-
eral other state GOP leaders pointedly refused to endorse the 
Union Democrat, the r 880 presidential contest is a better indicator 
oflong-term partisan attachments than is the 1882 court of appeals 
vote. The Republicans, white and black, voted six to one for 
(segregated) racial equality, the Democrats two to one against, 
and the Greenbackers eighteen to one against. Democratic over-
tures to the blacks were somewhat more than rhetoric, but not 
much; whereas the Republicans, while refusing to press for inte-
gration, which would have been suicidal as well as completely 
ineffective in the state at that time, overwhelmingly supported 
the largest practicable step toward black equality. 29 
28 See Appendix B for further discussion of the problem of ecological regression esti-
mates which fall outside the o-100% logical bounds and the use of the logit model to 
overcome this difficulty. 
29 Although the Democratic Louisville Post endorsed the 1882 Independent campaign, 
both my OLS and GLS estimates show no voters who supported Winfield Scott Hancock 
for President in 1880 backing Jacob in 1882. The estimates do show, however, that from 
7 to 19% of the Garfield supporters backed the Democratic candidate for Appeals Court 
Clerk, while about 95% of those who voted the Greenback ticket for James B. Weaver 
and turned out in 1882 seem to have favored Jacob. For the Post endorsement, see the 
issue of June 7, 1882. For the GOP split, see Louisville Commercial, June 19, July 25, 1882. 
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The final table presents legit coefficients masquerading as 
regression coefficients, partly to reduce the table's complexity and 
partly to demonstrate another guise of the malleable technique. 
The numbers in the table hold only for the roughly linear portions 
of the logarithmic relationships. In Table 9 I have included both 
political and socioeconomic variables in an attempt to separate 
out the effects of political philosophy and behavior from those of 
demographic traits. The figures show the 1880 Democrats and 
Greenbackers in a light rather more favorable to modern tastes, 
but only underline the exceptionally liberal behavior of the party 
of Abraham Lincoln and John Marshall Harlan. As in the legis-
lative analysis, a rise in the percentage of blacks in a county 
provided a significant push toward Bourbonism. Since newspaper 
reports of the election indicate that blacks overwhelmingly backed 
equalization, whites in the heavily black counties must have al-
Table 9 Logit Estim~tes of Change in Votes in Referendum for In-
creases in Political and Socioeconomic Variables of One Per-
cent3 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE 
Percent Dem., I 88o President 
Percent Rep., I 88o President 
Percent Grbk., I 880 President 
Percent Black 
Percent Urban 
Percent Catholic 
White Wealth (in $10oo's) 
White Tax Increase 
Black Spending Increase 
Percent Union Democratic 
FOR 
.176 
·598 
.264 
-.I73 
.015 
-.093 
.003 
.003 
-.oo8 
-.078 
CHANGE IN VOTING 
IN REFERENDUM 
AGAINST ABSTAIN 
-.oo8 -.I68 
-.406 -.192 
-.028 
-.2J6 
.257 -.084 
-.194 .180 
-.oo6 
.099 
.OIO -.013 
.019 -.016 
.047 -.039 
-.047 .OJ I 
a The relationships hold only between ± one standard deviation from the mean of the 
independent variables, and can be interpreted as giving the change in the dependent 
variables for a I% change in the relevant independent variable, holding all other inde-
pendent variables constant. 
Many blacks and other Republicans could not forget Jacob's leadership of the racist 
"Conservative Unionist" party in I867-68. See Webb, "'Pariah Among the Elect,"' II7, 
I20, I2J. Some blacks opposed the equalization measure because it mandated segregated 
schools, but numerous black gatherings throughout the state endorsed it. See Louisville 
Commercial, May I7, 22, 29,)une I, 5, IO, IS, I882. 
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most unanimously opposed it. Other things being equal, urbanite~ 
were barely more likely than their country cousins to vote "yes" 
in the election, but markedly less likely to vote "no." Roman 
Catholics appear to have been a little less favorable to a tax 
increase for the public schools than Protestants. None of the other 
variables had very large impacts on the referendum voting. 30 
The analysis presented in this article, as well as the more 
extensive efforts of other scholars, belies the statement of Franklin 
quoted at the outset. 31 Postbellum Kentucky blacks were fully 
cognizant of their increased freedom to convene, petition, and 
agitate, and they did so repeatedly. Aware of the legal tools 
available to them under the equal protection clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, they sued and won. Willing and able to use 
the political power granted by the Fifteenth Amendment, they 
effectively pressed most white Republicans, as well as some Dem-
ocrats, to pledge themselves to meet the blacks' most important 
goal. In short, Kentucky blacks exercised the rights of equal 
citizenship promised by the postwar amendments to guarantee 
their children an equal share in educational spending in Kentucky, 
at least on the state level. In the school year 1882-83, in fact, 
figures in the state auditor's report indicate that the total common 
school expenditures per child from six to twenty, state and local, 
were $1.61 for whites and $2.01 for blacks. 32 
30 To see more precisely how the figures in Table 9 were arrived at, consider the entry 
in the first row of the first column. After the parameters of the regression equation were 
estimated by computer, I calculated the probability of voting for equalization in a county 
where the Democratic percentage was one standard deviation above the statewide Dem-
ocratic mean, while all the other variables in the table were set at their means. I then 
repeated the calculation, setting the proportion of Democrats at one standard deviation 
below the statewide average for that party, while the other variables stayed at their means. 
Finally, I subtracted the second from the first probability, and divided the result by twice 
the standard deviation of the Democratic percentage in order to obtain the change in the 
probability of voting for equalization for each 1% change in the Democratic proportion 
in the 188o race for the presidency. The other cell entries were calculated analogously. 
31 Although many examples could be cited, one might start with Howard N. Rabinow-
itz, Race Relations in the Urban South, 1865-1890 (New York, 1978). 
32 Separate taxation and expenditure systems persisted in scattered areas until 1936, 
despite repeated court rulings against them, but there was apparently much less discrim-
ination against the vast majority of black children in Kentucky than against those in states 
further south. Charles S. Mangum, The Legal Status of the Negro (Chapel Hill, 1940), 
12e>-125; Leonard Ephraim Meece, Negro Education in Kentucky: A Comparative Study of 
White and Negro Education on the Elementary and Secondary School Levels (Lexington, Ky., 
1938), 21-22, 6o, 105, u8-II9. Common school expenditures calculated from figures in 
Report of the Kentucky State Auditor, J88J-J88J, 126-134, 22e>-227. 
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In their struggle to eliminate the grosser forms of racial 
inequality, the blacks succeeded only with the assistance of sym-
pathetic whites. Bagby skillfully argued the Ellis case, obtaining 
a favorable result from two southern white Republican federal 
judges, Baxter of North Carolina and Tennessee and John W. 
Barr ofKentucky. Breathitt, a native white Kentucky Republican 
from the county with the second highest proportion of blacks in 
the state, was the chief proponent of equalization in the legislature, 
as well as a forceful proponent of seating blacks on juries and the 
principal adversary of the whipping post. A member of a family 
which produced two of the state's governors and a lieutenant 
governor, Breathitt proved by later becoming the state's attorney 
general that an association with blacks' struggles was no bar to 
office in postbellum Kentucky. The great mass of Republican 
voters, moreover, staunchly backed the merging of funds in the 
referendum. In fact, southern white Republican support of meas-
ures upholding black equality and repelling attempts to increase 
discrimination, although by no means universal, was common 
enough to suggest the propriety of their inclusion on Woodward's 
list of the forces restraining the South's "capitulation to extreme 
racism" in the late nineteenth century. 33 
A substantially smaller number of southern Democrats, es-
pecially those from affiuent urban areas and from counties which 
had few blacks, also stood up for equalization. Counties with 
strong Republican movements produced "regular" Democrats, 
whereas counties in which the GOP was weak sent to the legis-
lature disproportionate numbers ofboth liberals and reactionaries. 
But the vast bulk of that party's legislators in I 882 opposed equal 
spending until the Ellis case made it a fait accompli, and some 
continued to protest against the inevitable even then. Further-
33 Barr concurred in Ellis and wrote a similar opinion in Claybrook v. Owensboro, r6 
Fed. 297 (r883). On Barr and Baxter, see Harold Chase et al., Biographical Dictionary of the 
Federal judiciary (Detroit, 1976}, 15, 17; on Barr, see also Levin, Lawyers and Lawmakers, 
r w-r6o; on Baxter, see Mary U. Rothrock (ed.), The French-Broad-Holston Country: A 
History of Knox County, Tennessee (Knoxville, 1946}, 376. On Breathitt, see William Henry 
Perrin (ed.), County of Christian, Kentucky, Historical and Biographical (Chicago, 1884), 94, 
128-129, r 84, 345-346; E. Polk Johnson, A History of Kentucky and Kentuckians (Chicago, 
1912), II, 6S!f-66o; "Breathitt Family File," Kentucky Historical Society, Frankfort, Ken-
tucky. For his actions on the rights of blacks and extensive reports of his speeches, see 
Louisville Commercial, Jan. ro, 21, April24, r882. C. Vann Woodward's list in The Strange 
Career of Jim Crow (New York, 1974; 3rd rev. ed.), 44-64, contains neither blacks nor 
white southern Republicans. 
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more, in the August referendum, about two thirds of the Dem-
ocrats who voted seem to have deserved the "Bourbon" label 
attached to them by scornful Republicans. 
' If political parties differed sharply in their adherence to ra-
cism, so did denizens of different types of counties. Counties 
which contained comparatively large proportions of Catholics 
were less favorable to equalization in the referendum than more 
heavily Protestant areas, presumably as a result of a greater degree 
of opposition to taxation for public schools. Whites from heavily 
black counties and rural counties were much more likely than 
Kentuckians from urban areas and from largely white counties to 
oppose equalization in the August vote, and the same patterns 
held among Democrats and Greenbackers in the legislature. In 
short, racist behavior was neither pervasive nor equally prevalent 
among white Kentuckians. Republicans, urbanites, and those who 
lived in counties with relatively few blacks were much more 
willing to accept the 'postwar settlement than Democrats, Green-
backers, country folk, and especially residents of former planta-
tion areas. Historians who have neglected to distinguish degrees 
of racism among southern whites or failed to note that, outside 
the Deep South at least, blacks in the post-Reconstruction era 
were neither powerless nor friendless should reassess their gen-
eralizations. 
Finally, many of these substantive conclusions could be 
reached only because of the availability of sophisticated quanti-
tative techniques, specifically logit analysis. The usefulness of this 
technique, not only in disentangling the correlates of legislative 
behavior, but also in allowing logically satisfactory estimates of 
voters' actions, should stimulate more historians to employ it. 34 
34 Logit and probit can also be used in cases where the dependent variable is nominal. 
For instance, it can be employed to determine the correlates of moving or staying in 
analyses of social or geographic mobility. For an example, see Michael P. Weber and 
Anthony E. Boardman, "Economic Growth and Occupational Mobility in Nineteenth-
Century Urban America: A Reappraisal," journal of Social History, II (1977), 52-72. 
Appendix A 
The variance of the error term in a regression based on data aggregated 
over geographical units which differ widely in population is not con-
stant, yet OLS assumes that variance is constant. We can partially remedy 
the situation, however, if we first recognize why the error variance is 
not constant. 
Suppose one is interested in how individuals vote. Then for each 
individual, we can estimate a probability that he will vote, say, Dem-
ocratic, given certain traits, by an equation such as: 
(I) Yu = {3'Xu + Uu, 
where the i subscript refers to counties, the j subscript to individuals, 
the Y is a vector of voter choices, the X a matrix of traits or independent 
variables, and the U a vector of error terms with expected value zero. 
The variance of the error term is 
which is assumed in regression to be constant. 
Unfortunately, we observe data only on the county, not the indi-
vidual level, so that equation (I) becomes: 
Nt Nt Nt 
(3) ~ Yu/Nt = {3' ~ Xu/Nt + ~ Uu/Nt , 
i=l 1=1 1=1 
where the N 1s refer to the number of people in county 1, and the 
summations are across all individuals in each county. 
The variance of the error term here is: 
(4) E (Lf~, Uu) 2 = E (Lf~, Yu _ {3 Lf~, Xu) 2 N 1 N 1 N 1 
Since the errors are assumed to be independent across all individuals, 
the expectation for each county of the square of the errors is equal to 
the sum of the expectation of the errors squared, or 
And since the N 1 in the denominator is a constant, its expected value is 
just itself, so we have 
(6) E (Lf~~~Uur = ~i [E(Uu)z] = ~~ [E(Uu)z] 
which differs from (2) by the factor of 1/N1. 
To correct for this divergence, we multiply the whole equation 
through by ~, or the square root of the population in each county, 
gtvmg us: 
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(7) 
which reduces to 
. 
And the error variance is 
(9) E (L~,;, Uu)2 = E (L~,;, Yu - {3 L~,;, Xu)2 VNi VN; \IN; . 
By the same arguments as stated earlier, we can take the sums and 
constants outside the expectations, giving us 
1 Ni 1 Ni 
(ro) Ni ~~~ [E(Uu)2] = Ni ~~~ [E(Yu - f3Xu)2], 
and the sums on both sides are equal to Nu, giving us finally 
N· N 1 (rr) N: [E(Uu)2],= N· [E(Yu- f3Xu) 2]. 
i 1 
All the N 1s cancel, and we see that if we estimate the parameters by first 
multiplying both the independent and dependent variables through by 
~for each county, we have equation (r). 
Appendix B 
We can obtain estimates from aggregated data which fall outside the 
o-Ioo percent logical boundaries for three reasons. Often, we have a 
fairly small sample of observations, and by chance the slope of the 
reg'ression line gives us unreasonable estimates. If we had a very large 
sample, the slope would be different, and the estimates of, say, the 
probability of Greenbackers voting "no" in the referendum would be 
admissable. Usually, such estimates are not very far outside the bounds, 
and it is sufficient to set them at the logical limits and recalculate the 
equations accordingly. But it may be that the logic.al complications arise 
because we have tried to extrapolate too far beyond our data points or 
that we have estimated the wrong model. 35 In such cases, logit may be 
useful. 
Consider the problem in estimating what proportion of Greenback-
ers voted against equalization. The maximum percentage of the adult 
males who voted in the 1880 presidential race was 3 1. 7 percent. The 
highest proportion of votes against equalization in r882 was 62-4 per-
cent. As Figure 2 shows, all the data points are concentrated in the rather 
small shaded rectangle in the lower left-hand corner of the graph. But 
in trying to estimate what percentage of the Greenbackers voted against 
equalization, we are, in effect, predicting how a county which was 
composed only of members of that party (i.e., which was 100 percent 
Greenback) would vote. To do this, we have to project the linear 
regression line to the point at which it cuts the vertical line on the right-
hand side of the graph. Yet this is far beyond the data, all of which lie 
in the shaded box. If our data extended beyond the shaded area, they 
might lie on a different linear regression line, or even on a nonlinear 
curve. The point is that it is dangerous to extrapolate so far beyond the 
available data, and we should not be too surprised to get nonsensical 
results if we do so. 
It is also unreasonable to believe that the world will always be 
linear. If, in fact, the relationship between two or more variables were 
not linear, we may get illogical estimates because we have estimated an 
incorrect model. Besides graphing the bivariate relationships and ex-
amining them to see whether they fall into obvious nonlinear patterns 
(log-linear, quadratic, etc.), we might also consider relationships which 
follow the form of the logit. The logit function describes an S-shaped 
curve, as in Figure I, which has an appealing behavioral interpretation. 
For data in the middle ranges of each variable, the logit relationship is 
approximately linear. For data on the extremes, however, the curve tails 
off quite quickly, and asymptotically approaches the X axis and the line 
parallel to the X axis at Y = 100 percent. Substantively, the theory 
underlying the curve states that a change in the independent variable 
from, say, 40 to 6o percent causes a large change in the dependent 
variable, but a change from o to 20 percent or from So to 100 percent 
3 5 Kousser, "Ecological Regression and the Analysis of Past Politics," journal of Inter-
disciplinary History, IV (1973), 252-262. 
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Fig. 2 Bivariate Relationship between Percentage of Greenback, 1 88o, 
and Percentage Against Equalization, 1882 Referendum 
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does not. Once a county is overwhelmingly "X" or "not X," changes 
in the value of X make little difference in Y. If the analyst has reason to 
believe that such a behavioral assumption is appropriate for his data, he 
should consider trying to fit a logit model. Moreover, the logit model 
may also provide a better extrapolation from a limited set of data, such 
as that in Figure 2, for it allows a relaxation of the very strong linear 
assumption. It is for this reason that I used logit to estimate the rela-
tionships in Table 8. 
